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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigate the social welfare implications of the European and American 
definition of affordable prices when a country is divided into independent zones. We find that the 
European definition is always soc ial welfare superior, because it forces to keep lower prices. We 
also introduce to new defintions of affordable prices. The first definition advocates for a common 
price for the unprofitable area. We prove that this definition is social welfare superior to the 
current definitions. In the second definition denote as “yardstick pricing” , we define the 
affordable prices for the unprofitable areas as a function that does not depende on their own zone 
profitable area price. We show that yardstick price is more efficient for social welfare when the 
differences in demand among zones are not very large . 
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1 Introduction
In the telecommunications market regulators place a high value to the ac-
cess of all consumers to the service. This goal has been termed Universal
Service. There are several reasons why regulators may want to pursue the
goal of universal service, such as equity, economic development, and even eco-
nomic efficiency (due to sizeable network externalities). One of the important
characteristic of the telecommunications markets is that some countries, e.g.
USA or Argentina, have divided their national territory in independent zones,
where each zone is a market on its own.1
Universal Service has been defined by European and American authori-
ties in a similar way. The European Parliament and the Council stipulate the
obligation for the member states that Universal Service is a set of services
”made available with the quality specified to all end-users in their territory,
irrespective of their geographical location, and, in the light of specific national
conditions, at an affordable price”.2 The American regulator concept of Uni-
versal Service consists in ”ensuring quality telecommunications services at
affordable rates to consumers, in all regions of the nation, including rural,
insular, and high-cost areas”.3 Thus one of the most important Universal
Service goals is that all consumers must enjoy affordable prices.4
Although both regulations seek to set affordable prices, what the differ-
ent regulators understand for affordable prices is not exactly the same. If
we take the American definition of affordable prices, we find: ”the Commis-
sion shall adopt rules to require that the rates charged by providers of in-
terexchange telecommunication services to subscribers in rural and high cost
markets shall not be higher than the rates charged by each such provider to
its suscriber in urban markets. Such rules shall also require that a provider
of interstate interchange telecommunications services shall provide such ser-
vices to its subscribers in each state at rates no higher than the rates charged
to its subscribers in any other state”.5 Applying this definition, we find that,
1There is a tendency to split up the national telecommunication markets, for example
in Australia, the government has recently announced that it will introduce competition
into USO provision by inviting carriers to tender for the USO in two regional pilot areas.
2For further details, see the Directive 2002/22/CE of the European Parliament and the
Council.
3For further details, see Federal Communications Commission (1996), Docket n 96-45.
4This requirement of the Universal Service arises because the price differentials expected
to prevail in an unregulated setting are deemed unacceptable by regulators.
5For further details, see Telecommunications act (1996)
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within USA, there may be different prices.
On the other hand, if we check the European definition of affordable
prices, we find: ”Affordable price means a price defined by Member States
at National level in the light of specific national conditions, and may involve
setting common tariffs irrespective of location or special tariff options to deal
with the needs of low-income users. Affordability for individual consumers
is related to their ability to monitor and control their expenditure”.6 Thus,
the European Union opts for setting a unique price per country, what in
principle is more restrictive. Although within EU there can be countries
with the national market divided in independent zones where firms do not
operate simultaneously in all zones, all firms are obliged to set the same price.
We have that there are two streams about how to set affordable prices, one
more restrictive, the European, and the other, the American, more concerned
with the ”no intervention” paradigm.
In order to attain the objectives of Universal Service, the regulator must
impose Universal Service Obligations (USOs hereafter) on the industry.7 In
the case of affordable prices, USOs are constraints imposed by regulators
on firms. These constraints take the form of either uniform pricing, which
forces the firms to offer their services to all its consumers at a geographically
uniform price, or a price cap, which establishes a maximum average price
of firms’ services. Telecommunications markets are generally characterized
by a small number of networks, so that the resulting competition will be
oligopolistic. This makes that constraints imposed by USOs may create
strategic effects, and therefore affect competition.
The academic literature has not treated very deeply the definition of af-
fordable prices. Few papers, Valletti et al. (2002) or Iozzi (2001), study the
impact of the price constraints on competition. They compare the scenario
where there is a unique zone which consists in two markets (profitable and
unprofitable) with no price restrictions with a scenario where firms are forced
to set a uniform price in both markets. In these papers, as in others such
as Chone et al. (2002), Anton et al. (2002), Gasmi et al. (2000) or Rosston
and Wimmer (2000), the key point is that they consider only an unprof-
itable market and a profitable market. In this context, they always consider
6For further details, see Directive 2002/22/CE of the European Parliament and Council
(2002).
7In the countries where the Telecommunication market was recently open to competi-
tion, for example Spain, USOs are only applied to the Incumbent Carrier, Telefonica in
the case of Spain.
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that an affordable price for the unprofitable market is equal to the price of
the profitable market.8 With this common setup, the literature concludes
that setting a common price in both, the unprofitable and profitable mar-
ket, creates an strategic link between both markets that makes higher the
equilibrium price. This is so, because one of the firms is a monopolist in the
unprofitable market. This firm is always interesting in relaxing competition
in the profitable market to enjoy a higher profit in the unprofitable market
through a price increase.
In this paper, we address the question of which of the regulatory defini-
tions of affordable prices at work is better from a social point of view. This
needs of models which are closer to reality. We need to extend the existing
models of USOs by considering a country which is divided in zones where each
zone consists in an unprofitable area and a profitable area.9 We also propose
two new definitions of affordable prices. In one of these definitions, the price
in all unprofitable areas in the country is a convex combination of the prices
in the profitable areas. In the other definition, we propose that the price in
any unprofitable area is a function, e.g. the sample mean, of the prices of all
profitable areas but the profitable area the unprofitable area is attached to.
We denote this definition of affordable prices ”yardstick pricing”.
To do so, we extend the model by Anton et al. (2002). We need to
consider that the country is divided in more than one independent zone, each
one with one profitable area and one unprofitable area.10 We show that the
European regulation is social welfare superior to the American regulation.11
This is because the European regulation applies to the whole country the
minimum price between the different prices that the American regulation
sets in the different zones of the country.
We also show that our first definition of affordable prices is welfare supe-
rior to the European. Setting the same price in all the unprofitable areas as
a convex combination of the prices in the profitable areas allows us to break
8In some of these papers, it is defined the price of the unprofitable area as lower or
equal than the price in the profitable area. In equilibrium, both prices are always equal.
9All the unprofitable areas form the profitable market. All the profitable areas form
the profitable market.
10We represent our set-up with a graph in Figure 1. Area 1 of the U market and area 1
of the R market form zone 1. Area 2 of the U market and area 2 of the R market form zone
2. This is the present situation in Argentina and USA, where the countries are divided in
more than one independent zone.
11Under the assumption taken by the literature of only one zone (which consists in the
whole unprofitable area and the whole profitable area), both regulations are identical.
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partially the strategic link between the profitable and unprofitable areas. We
can enjoy scenarios where the social welfare is at least equal to the situation
where the country enjoys the price from the European regulation for some of
the areas but for one profitable area which enjoys an even lower price.
To conclude we show that with our second definition, yardstick pricing,
we can break completely the strategic link between the profitable and unprof-
itable areas. This leads to a much lower price than under current regulatory
regimes definitions and the first proposed definition. But there is a limit to
this definition. We need consumers’ demands in the different zones to be
very similar. Otherwise, it may yield undesirable social welfare results.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 analyzes the current regulatory frameworks and their implications for Social
Welfare. In Section 4, the first new definition of affordable prices is presented
and analyzed. In section 5, we present and analyze yardstick pricing. Section
6 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Costs and Demands
A country has two differentiated markets, one urban (U) and one rural (R).
Demand in the U market is DU(p) = 1− p, and in the R market is DR(p) =
b(1− p), where p is the market price and b > 0. Both market demands have
a common price intercept at p = 1, whereas the slope coefficient b allows the
R market demand to be smaller or larger than the U market demand. In
many situations, we expect the R market demand to be smaller.12
Each market is divided into two areas that can be of equal or different
size. We denote by DU1 (p) = α1(1− p) and DU2 (p) = α2(1− p) , α1+α2 = 1,
the demands of areas 1 and 2 of the U market. The demands of areas 1 and 2
of the R market are, respectively, DR1 (p) = β1b(1−p) and DR2 (p) = β2b(1−p),
with β1 + β2 = 1. Each area of the R market is attached to one of the areas
of the U market, to constitute a zone. More precisely, area 1 of the R market
is attached to area 1 of the U market, and area 2 of the R market is attached
12This modelling strategy for the demand functions is taken from Anton et al (2002).
Note that they describe a country where the differences between consumers in the two
markets are not large.
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to area 2 of the U market.13 They constitute zone 1 and zone 2 respectively.
To further clarify the country division, see figure 1.
The fixed cost of area 1 and 2 of the U market are respectively FU1 and
FU2 . The fixed costs of area 1 and 2 of the R market are F
R
1 and F
R
2 .
14 There
is a constant marginal cost, c, which is the same for the whole country. We
assume, without loss of generality, that c = 0.15 Finally, there is a duopoly in
each zone. To simplify the analysis, we assume that no firm operates in both
zones. The firms that serve the areas of the R market and the subsidies that
these firms receive for being in charge of USOs are determined by a political
decision, and it is here exogenously given.
2.2 The game
We consider a simple complete information game. The timing of the game
goes as follows:
1. Firms in both duopolies choose quantities in their areas of the U market.
We denote by qij, the quantity that the firm i = S,N produces in the
area j = 1, 2, where S denotes the firms which provides the service
obligations and hence operates in both areas, and N denotes the firm
which only operates in the U area. The prices in each area of the U
market are:
pUj = 1−
(qSj + qNj)
αj
, j = 1, 2
2. The prices in the areas of the R market are determined through different
rules which depend on the definition of affordable prices the government
adopts.
3. Each firm payoffs are realized, where firms payoffs are the sum of the
profits, including any subsidy.
13This set-up is consistent, for instance, with the situation in Argentina and the USA.
Both countries have been divided into zones, and within zones there are profitable and
unprofitable areas.
14In general, we may suppose that the size of the fixed costs are not perfectly correlated
with the size of the demand that each area has. Under this assumption, we can model all
kind of countries, with different density of population and orography.
15This assumption is consistent with the fact that variable costs in industries that sup-
port USOs are close to zero, as for example in telecommunications or water.
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The Cournot competition in the U market serves to streamline the anal-
ysis and allow us to consider a homogeneous good for which the cross-area
price constraints are unambiguous.16 We look for the subgame perfect equi-
librium of this game focusing on pure strategies.
2.3 Social Welfare
We take two different measueres of social welfare. In the first one, SW1, social
welfare is the sum of consumers surplus plus firms profits in each zone. This is
the standard definition of social welfare when analyzing regulatory problems.
In the second one, SW2, social welfare is only the sum of consumers’ surplus
in the R market.17 This is an extreme representation of using USOs as a way
to promote a more harmonious distribution away from large metropolitan
areas.18
3 Benchmarks: Current definitions of afford-
able prices
We begin our discussion by studying the different definitions of affordable
prices and their implications for social welfare.
As we have described in the introduction, we face two different streams
on how to set affordable prices when a country has more than one profitable
and unprofitable area. We study first the one leaded by the Federal Com-
munication Commission in the USA. This definition advocates for a price
cap in each area of the R market in such a way that the price cannot be
larger than the price set in the area of the U market which it is attached to,
i.e. pRj ≤ pUj , for j = 1, 2.19 In other words, within a zone, consumers in the
R area cannot be charged higher prices than consumers in the U area. We
16As an alternative strategic mode, we could employ price setting competition (differen-
tiated Bertrand). While this does not alter the basic strategic link between the U and R
markets, it does introduce additional issues such as how to interpret the cross-areas price
constraints when products are differentiated.
17SW2 is consistent with a regulator who wants to base distributional comparisons on
the well-being of the USOs target group.
18Alternatively, it can be argued that SW2 represents the objective function of a reg-
ulator captured by rural consumers. In a different context than ours, it has been shown
that the strong farmer unions may capture a regulator by political lobbying.
19For further details, see Telecommunications Act (1996), section 254.
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introduce this constraint into our game at the third stage, and we proceed
to solve it by backward induction. 20
First, we look for the price in the areas of the R market. It is straight-
forward to see that the constraints pRj ≤ pUj are going to be binding in
equilibrium. Note that the monopoly prices in the areas of the R market are
higher than the equilibrium prices in the respective areas of the U market,
so that pRj = p
U
j , for both j = 1, 2.
At the second stage, we search for the equilibrium quantities. Recall that
we denote by qij the quantity that firm i = S,N , supplies in the U area of
the zone it belongs to. Thus, given the quantities supplied in each area of the
U market, prices in zone j are pUj = 1− (qSj+qNj)αj for j = 1, 2. Consequently,
using pRj = p
U
j , profits for the firms that operate in both areas of a given
zone are:
ΠSj = (1− (qSj + qNj)
αj
)(qSj +
βjb(qSj + qNj)
αj
)− FUj − FRj + sj,
where sj stands for the subsidy that a firm providing USOs receives from
the government.
Profits for the firms that only operate in the U areas are:
ΠNj = (1− (qSj + qNj)
αj
)qNj − FUj .
Given the profit functions, we derive the reaction functions, which are:
rSj(qNj) =
αj
2
− (αj + 2βjb)qNj
2(αj + βjb)
rNj(qSj) =
αj − qSj
2
.
20Given the resulting model, there are some remarks that should be made. First, the
adopted time of events is the one that makes the cross-areas constraints operate in a
natural way. If quantities in both markets were set simultaneously, it would create the
problem of how to impose the price constraints in the areas of the R market. Second, the
firms that provide USOs should not be viewed as price takers in the areas of the R market.
Given the cross-areas price constraints, the firms are free to set any price in the areas of
the R market up to the ceiling. More importantly, the ceiling is endogenous with respect
to the firms actions.
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The reaction functions yield the equilibrium quantities:
q∗Sj =
α2j
3αj + 2βjb
, q∗Nj =
αj(αj + βjb)
3αj + 2βjb
,
and the equilibrium prices under the American regulation:
pUAj =
(αj + βjb)
3αj + 2βjb
, j = 1, 2.
From these equilibrium prices, we can derive two kind of conclusions.
First, the prices across zones are different. Second, in each zone there is a
strategic link between the U and R areas that makes the equilibrium prices
to be higher than in a standard Cournot model.21 If we take the derivative
of the price with respect to αj and βj, we see that it is negative with respect
to the former and positive with respect to the latter. This shows that the
strategic link within a zone is stronger when the relative weight of the R area
becomes larger. This is so because the firm S, which operates in both areas,
is more interested in relaxing competition in the U area the larger is the R
area that it can be monopolized. The question that remains unanswered is
how should the areas be to obtain the maximum possible social welfare.
Proposition 1 A regulator must set αj = βj to maximize social welfare
under both SW1 and SW2.
The implications of proposition 1 are several. First, it establishes that
the R market must be divided so as to replicate the division of the U market.
Consequently, the size of the U market areas must be taken into account when
deciding upon the division of the R market. Second, at the optimal division,
prices do not vary across geographical zone. More precisely, at αj = βj, we
have pUA1 = p
UA
2 = p
R
1 = p
R
2 .
22
We turn now to analyze the implications of the European Council
definition of affordable prices. This definition advocates for a common price
in the whole country.23 This definition is more restrictive, because it adds
21The existence of this strategic link is shown in Anton et al. (2002) and Valletti et al.
(2002).
22Therefore, the set-ups analyzed in papers as Anton et al. (2002) or Valletti et al.
(2002) are optimal under the American Regulation.
23For further details, see Directive 2002/22/CE of the European Parliament and the
Council.
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to the American definition a new constraint. This new constraint consists in
forcing zone 1 to set the same price than zone 2. In principal, this opens two
possibilities, depending on whether the regulator can decide on the size of the
areas of the U and R markets or not. If the regulator can decide α1 and β1
the regulation can be trivially fulfilled without affecting the firms decisions.
But, if on the contrary, α1 and β1 are given, then the European regulation
may have a bite on welfare. In what follows we analyze these two cases.
Proposition 2 If α1
β1
= 1, zone 1 and the zone 2 enjoy the same price than
under the American definition.
If α1=β1, the strategic link between the area 1 of the U market and area
1 of the R market is as strong as the strategic link between the area 2 of
the U market and area 2 of the R market. This gives raise to equal prices in
both zones.
The most likely situation for a regulator is that she cannot decide the
size of the areas of the U and R markets.24 In this case, if the regulator does
not impose a new restriction on the firms, the prices in both zones would be
different as it was shown when analyzing the American definition.
Proposition 3 If α1
β1
6= 1, the regulator introduces the price-cap pUEj ≤
min{PUA1 , PUA2 }, j = 1, 2 to ensure the same price for the whole country.
Note that pUA1 and p
UA
2 are the equilibrium prices that firms would choose
if they were under the American definition of affordable prices, whereas pUEj
is the price under the European Regulation in area 1 and 2 of the U market.
The regulator needs to impose this new price-cap to ensure that the prices
within the zones 1 and 2 are the same. One may think that other common
prices for the country are possible by using another kind of price cap as it
may be a convex combination of pU1 and p
U
2 or even the maximum of both
prices. But, under either possibility, prices across zones will not be equal.
There is another alternative to ensure a unique price in the whole country.
This alternative consists in the regulator setting directly the price but we do
not consider it because it is too intrusive.
The remaining question that we now try to answer is which definition
brings the highest social welfare. The ranking is unambiguous under either
measure of social welfare. This is the content of next proposition
24There are very little chances for a regulator of diving the country as she wishes due
to either political or physical reasons.
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Proposition 4 The European definition brings higher social welfare than the
American definition.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 is straightforward. We show in Propo-
sition 3 that the European definition is implemented using the prices derived
under the American definition and adding a new price-cap. This price-cap
forces to lower the price in the zone where it was higher, keeping constant the
lowest price. So, at the end of the day, with the European definition there is
a zone where the price is the same as in the American definition, and a zone
where the price is lower, what means that the social welfare is higher under
the European definition.
4 An alternative definition (I): a common price
for the R market
We introduce a new definition of affordable price. We propose that all con-
sumers in the whole R market have to pay the same price regardless of the
geographic zone where they live. In other words, areas 1 and 2 of the R
market share the same price. We will model this definition by imposing a
price cap on the price in the R market, so that pR cannot be larger than the
convex combination of the prices in the U areas, that is pR ≤ θpU1 +(1−θ)pU2 ,
θ ∈ [0, 1].25
As in the other cases, we introduce this definition into our game in the
third stage. In addition, we now need to add up a new stage prior to the
first stage of the primitive game, where a regulator decides about the value
of θ in order to maximize social welfare.26 Once we have defined the game,
we solve it using backward induction. As in the previous cases, it is also
straightforward to see that the constraint pR ≤ θpU1 + (1 − θ)pU2 will be
binding in equilibrium. The monopoly prices in the areas of the R market
are higher than the convex combination of the equilibrium prices in the areas
of the U market. Thus pR = θpU1 + (1− θ)pU2 .
25This definition tries to capture the regulatory police on USOs by OFTEL. In July
1997, OFTEL established the level of Universal Service for the 4 year period from 1997 to
2001 as comprising the provision of universal services at ”geographically averaged prices.”.
26It is worthy to point out that the equilibrium prices in the areas of the U market may
be different across zones under this definition.
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Once the price in the R market is determined, we solve for the equilibrium
quantities in the U market areas. Recall that the prices in the U market are:
pUj = 1−
(qSj + qNj)
αj
, j = 1, 2.
Therefore, profits for the firm that operates in both areas of zone 1 are:
ΠS1 = (1− (qS1 + qN1)
α1
qS1)+
(1−(θ(qS1 + qN1)
α1
+
(1− θ)(qS2 + qN2)
α2
))bβ1(
θ(qS1 + qN1)
α1
+
(1− θ)(qS2 + qN2)
α2
)
−FR1 − FU1 + s1.
Profits for the firm that only operates in the U area of zone 1 are:
ΠN1 = (1− (qS1 + qN1)
α1
)qN1 − FU1 .
Profits for the firm that operates in both areas of zone 2 are:
ΠS2 = (1− (qS2 + qN2)
α2
)qS2+
(1−(θ(qS1 + qN1)
α1
+
(1− θ)(qS2 + qN2)
α2
))bβ2(
θ(qS1 + qN1)
α1
+
(1− θ)(qS2 + qN2)
α2
)
−FR2 − FU2 + s2.
Finally, profits for the firm that only operates in the U area of zone 2 are:
ΠN2 = (1− (qS2 + qN2)
α2
)qN2 − FU1 .
We maximize the profits of all firms with respect to their respective quan-
tities. The reaction functions we obtain from the maximization problems
yield the following equilibrium quantities:
12
q∗∗S1 =
α1(α1(3α2 + 3bβ(1− θ)2)− 2α2bβ1(1− θ)θ)
3(α1(3(1− α1) + 2b(1− β1)(1− θ)2)) + 2(1− α1)bβ1θ2)) ,
q∗∗N1 =
α1(α1(3α2 + 2bβ2(1− θ)2) + α2bβ1θ(1 + 2θ))
3(α1(3(1− α1) + 2b(1− β1)(1− θ)2)) + 2(1− α1)bβ1θ2)) ,
q∗∗S2 =
α2(2α2bβ1θ
2 + 3α1α2 − α1(2bβ2(1− θ)θ))
3(α1(3(1− α1) + 2b(1− β1)(1− θ)2)) + 2(1− α1)bβ1θ2)) ,
q∗∗N2 =
α2(2α2bβ1θ
2 + α1(3α2 + bβ2(3− 5θ + 2θ2)))
3(α1(3(1− α1) + 2b(1− β1)(1− θ)2)) + 2(1− α1)bβ1θ2))
and the equilibrium prices:
pU1 =
α1(3α2 + 2bβ2(1− θ)2) + α2bβ1θ(1 + 2θ)
3(α1(3α2 + 2bβ2(1− θ)2) + 2α2bβ1θ2) ,
pU2 =
α1(α2 + bβ2(3− 5θ + 2θ2)) + 2α2bβ1θ2
3(α1(3α2 + 2bβ2(1− θ)2) + 2α2bβ1θ2) ,
pR =
α1(α2 + bβ2(1− θ)2) + α2bβ1θ2)
3(α1(3α2 + 2bβ2(1− θ)2) + 2α2bβ1θ2) .
Finally, given the equilibrium prices and quantities, the regulator chooses
θ so that the social welfare is maximized. Next proposition characterizes the
regulator choices under SW1.
Proposition 5 Under SW1, for a given α1 and b, in the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium, the regulator chooses:
1. θ∗ = 1, for all β1 ∈ [0, β11]
2. θ∗ = 0, for all β1 ∈ [β1, 1]
3. θ∗ ∈ (0, 1), for all β1 ∈ [β1, β1]
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where β
1
is an increasing function on α1 and b, and β1 is an increasing
function on α1 and decreasing on b.
To analyze deeply the implications of this new definition we focus on three
cases: θ∗ = 0, θ∗ = 1 and θ∗ = 1
2
. We only study these three cases for two
reasons. First, because θ∗ = 0, θ∗ = 1 are the most likely equilibria. Second,
we have also chosen θ∗ = 1
2
as a representation of an interior equilibria
because if we consider all possible equilibria, the analysis becomes rather
complex as to allow us to get any conclusive result.
Note that, in equilibrium, this definition of affordable prices can be easily
redefined when we consider only the equilibria θ∗ = 0 and θ∗ = 1, either as
pR = min{pUA1 , pUA2 } or as pR = max{pUA1 , pUA2 }.27
Without lost of generality, we suppose that min{pUA1 , pUA2 } = pUA1 , or
equivalently, min{ β1
α1
, β2
α2
} = β1
α1
. In this case, if the regulator wishes to set pR
as min{pUA1 , pUA2 }, he would choose θ∗ = 1. This means that the profits of
the firm that operates in both areas of zone 1 are given by:
ΠS1 = (1− (qS1 + qN1)
α1
)(qS1 +
β1b(qS1 + qN1)
α1
)− FU1 − FR1 + s1,
and for the firm that operates only in the urban area of zone 1 are:
ΠN1 = (1− (qS1 + qN1)
α1
)qN1 − FU1 .
These profit functions are identical to those under the American definition
of affordable prices.
We turn now to analyze zone 2. In this case, the profit function of the
firm that operates in both areas is:
ΠS2 = (1− (qS2 + qN2)
α2
)qS2+
+(1− (qS1 + qN1)
α1
)(
β2b(qS1 + qN1)
α1
)− FU2 − FR2 + s2,
and for the firm that operates only in the area 2 of the U market:
27Recall that the prices pUA1 and p
UA
2 are the equilibrium prices under the American
definition.
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ΠN2 = (1− (qS2 + qN2)
α2
)qN2 − FU2 .
If we look at the profit functions, we can see that firm S2 profit function
depends upon quantities qS1 and qN1. Taking into account this fact, the
maximization problem reduces to a symmetric Cournot problem where only
area 2 of the U market matters. This means that consumers in area 2 of the
U market enjoy a lower price. To summarize, the R market and area 1 of
the U market share the same price which is pUA1 . Firms in the area 2 of the
U area set the symmetric Cournot price which is lower.28
We can make a similar analysis for the case where pR = max{pUA1 , pUA2 },
so that pR = max{ β1
α1
, β2
α2
}. If we suppose that max{pUA1 , pUA2 } = pUA2 , in
equilibrium, firms in the R market and in the area 1 of the U area set an
equal price which is higher than the symmetric Cournot price which is set in
the area 2 of the U market.29
Now, we analyze under what conditions a regulator decides to choose
pR = max{pUA1 , pUA2 } (θ∗ = 0) instead of pR = min{pUA1 , pUA2 } (θ∗ = 1) or the
equilibrium price that comes out from θ∗ = 1
2
.
We analyze first when the regulator chooses pR = max{pUA1 , pUA2 } instead
of pR = min{pUA1 , pUA2 }. At first sight, we may think that a regulator should
always choose pR = min{pUA1 , pUA2 }, because it ensures the minimum price
for three out of the four areas, and in addition, the remaining area enjoys the
symmetric Cournot price. This may be a reasonable argument, but it is not
always right. For example, one can imagine an scenario where the opposite
holds. Consider a situation as the one described graphically in the figure 3
of the appendix. For this case α1 < α2, and α1 < β1 < β2. In this scenario
pUA1 > p
UA
2 , but p
UA
1 − pUA2 can be arbitrarily small. If the regulator chooses
the minimum prices then pR = pUA2 = p
U
2 and p
U
1 = p
C , if the regulator
chooses the maximum prices then pR = pUA1 = p
U
1 and p
U
2 = p
C , where pC is
the symmetric Cournot price.
If the regulator chooses pUA1 , she gets the symmetric Cournot price for
the area 2 of the U market, which is much larger than the area 1 of the U
market. Thus, the regulator prefers to set pR = max{pUA1 , pUA2 }, because the
loss in social welfare in the whole R market and in area 1 of the U market is
more than overcome by the price drop in the area 2 of the U market.
28Even though pU2 < p
U
1 = p
UA
1 = p
R, it is still true that pUA2 ≥ pUA1
29Now pR = pUA2 = p
U
2 ≥ pUA1 > pU1
15
This example has shown that the optimal decision may involve to choose
the maximum price. To analyze this issue further, assume without loss of
generality that the area 1 of the R market is always bigger than the area 1 of
the U market, so that α1 < β1.
30 Then, a regulator chooses max{pUA1 , pUA2 }
when the following condition holds:
α1p
C + α2p
UA
1 + bp
UA
1 < α1p
UA
2 + α2p
C + bpUA2 .
This condition means that a regulator chooses max{pUA1 , pUA2 } instead of
min{pUA1 , pUA2 } when the sum of the prices, weighted by the size of the areas
where they are set, is lower under max{pUA1 , pUA2 }.31 If we operate the latter
condition, we obtain that it can be written as:
α1 + b
α2 + b
<
β2(3α1 + 2β1b)
β1(3α2 + 2β2b)
.
Choosing between min{pUA1 , pUA2 } and max{pUA1 , pUA2 } depends only on
the values taken by α1, β1 and b. This fact allow us to plot when regulator
chooses either max{pUA1 , pUA2 } or min{pUA1 , pUA2 }. We can see the result in
the graph in figure 2.
Before we analyze the graph, let us explain the role of the curved lines.
They can be interpreted as ”level curves”. Each one has an associated level
of b. For instance, if we take the curved line associated to b = 4, we know
that for the pairs (α1, β1) in the level curved if b ∈ [4,∞) a regulator chooses
max{pUA1 , pUA2 }, and if b ∈ [0, 4), he chooses min{pUA1 , pUA2 }. The first curved
line does not have any associated b. From this curved line upwards, up to
the line where α1 = β1, a regulator always chooses maximum no matter how
big is the R market.
The first important issue is why a regulator always chooses min{pUA1 , pUA2 }
whenever α1 >
1
2
.32 The reason is quite simple, he chooses so because if she
takes max{pUA1 , pUA2 } the social welfare is reduced for two reasons. First,
the U market area where the symmetric Cournot price is set is the smallest.
Second, the price in the whole R market and in the other U market area is
higher.
30This condition implies that max{pUA1 , pUA2 } = pUA1 and min{pUA1 , pUA2 } = pUA2 . The
results for the case when α1 > β1 are symmetric to the result found when α1 < β1 with
respect to the point (α1 = 0.5, β1 = 0.5).
31In this case, looking for the minimum weighted price is equivalent to look for the
highest social welfare, because α1, β1 and b are given.
32Recall that when α1 > 12 , β1 >
1
2 too.
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On the other hand, we find a region where a regulator always sets a price
equal to max{pUA1 , pUA2 }. This region starts in the line where α1 = β1, and
continues downwards until the first curved line is reached. If we take the
extreme case, α1 → β1, we easily see that the social welfare is always higher
when the regulator takes max{pUA1 , pUA2 }. The symmetric Cournot price is
in the largest U market area, while the increase in the price of the other
three areas is negligible. The same occurs in the whole region, although
the preference for max{pUA1 , pUA2 } becomes weaker as we move towards the
curved line. This region is wider when α1 is about
1
4
. This is because, as α1
goes to 1
2
the gains from setting the symmetric Cournot price in the area 2
of the U market decrease and at the same time, the losses in the other areas
increase.
Finally, the region that goes from the curved line we have referred in
the paragraph above to the line β1 =
1
2
is the region where, depending
on the size of the R market, a regulator chooses either min{pUA1 , pUA2 } or
max{pUA1 , pUA2 }. It is important to point out that the value of b needed
for making the minimum the optimal choice decreases as β1 gets close to
1/2. For fixed α1, when β1 → 12 the loss in social welfare of shifting from
min{pUA1 , pUA2 } to max{pUA1 , pUA2 } is very high because the increment in the
price is very significant.
To end the discussion on the regulator optimal choice for θ, we introduce
now into our analysis the choice θ∗ = 1
2
. Then the regulator has three possible
choices: θ∗ = 0, θ∗ = 1 and θ = 1
2
. When θ∗ = 1
2
, the price in the R market
takes an intermediate value between the prices from θ∗ = 0 and θ∗ = 1.
Therefore the regulator chooses θ∗ = 1
2
in the regions where, in the previous
analysis, she shifts her choice from θ∗ = 1 to θ∗ = 0. For example, if we
take the case where α1 = β1, we know that if the regulator can only choose
between θ∗ = 1 and θ∗ = 0, he shifts from θ∗ = 1 to θ∗ = 0 when β1 = 12 .
But, if we introduce the possibility for the regulator of choosing θ∗ = 1
2
, there
will be a segment including β1 =
1
2
where the regulator chooses θ∗ = 1
2
.
We observe that for a given b, it is more likely that θ∗ = 1
2
is chosen when
both, α1 and β1, are close to either
1
2
or zero. As one of them is close to
zero or 1 and the other takes intermediate values, it is more likely that the
regulator is only interested in choosing θ∗ = 1, i.e. pR = max{pUA1 , pUA2 }.
To conclude this discussion, we now study if this definition is superior to
the the American and European definitions of affordable prices.
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Proposition 6 Under SW1, if a regulator sets prices p
R ≤ θpU1 +(1− θ)pU2 ,
the social welfare is higher than under the American and European definition
of affordable prices.
If we think about what happens when a regulator chooses min{pUA1 , pUA2 },
we see that in one of the areas of the U market and in the whole R market
the min{pUA1 , pUA2 } is set, the same happens to theses areas when the Eu-
ropean definition is applied. But, in the other area of the U market, with
the definition we propose, the symmetric Cournot price is set instead of the
min{pUA1 , pUA2 }, which would be set under the European definition.33 As the
symmetric Cournot price is lower, the social welfare improves under the new
definition. Given this, and taken into account that a regulator only chooses
his other possible options for θ when they give larger social welfare than
min{pUA1 , pUA2 }, we can conclude that the new definition is superior to the
American and the European definition of affordable prices.
We turn now to study the regulator choice under SW2.
Proposition 7 Under SW2, for a given α1 and b, in the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium, the regulator chooses:
θ∗∗ =
α1(1− β1)
(1− α1)β1 + α1(1− β1) .
When the second definition is at work, she only takes interior values for θ,
because she is not internalizing the U market consumers prices. By definition,
the U market prices are one higher and the other lower than the R market
price. Thus, when the R market is not very large, the regulator is interesting
in setting the Cournot price in the largest U market area, what is very often
achieved choosing a corner solution. Either θ = 0 or θ = 1. By contrast,
under SW2 no area of the R market can hold the Cournot price, making
θ ∈ (0, 1) the optimal choice, see figure 6.
Regarding the comparison with the European and American definitions
of affordable prices, it is easy to see that this definition is superior from a
welfare viewpoint. As the regulator takes always interior solution for θ, this
means that she always chooses a better choice than min{pUA1 , pUA2 }(either
θ = 0 or θ = 1), because it is an available option for her and he does not
choose it.
33We refer only to the European definition, because we have proved that the European
definition is superior in terms of social welfare to the American definition.
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5 An alternative definition (II): yardstick pric-
ing
We introduce a second new definition of affordable prices. We propose that
the price in any of the R market areas has to be lower or equal than a function
of the prices in the U market areas excluding the price of the U market area
it is attached to.34 If we apply this definition to our model, the price of the
areas 1 and 2 of the R market cannot be higher than the price in the areas 2
and 1 of the U market respectively, pRj ≤ pUk , for j = 1, 2, such that k 6= j.35
Once we have described our new definition of prices for the R market
areas, we introduce it into our game in the third stage and we start solving
the game by backward induction. So, first, we figure out the prices set by
the firms for the different areas of the R market. The constraint pRj ≤ pUk ,
for j = 1, 2 such that k 6= j is binding in equilibrium. The monopoly price
in any R market area is always higher than the equilibrium prices of any U
market area. Thus, pRj = p
U
k , k 6= j.
The second stage is to find the equilibrium quantities in the U market
areas. The prices in the U market areas are determined by:
pUj = (1−
(qSj + qNj)
αj
), j = 1, 2.
Given this and pRj = p
U
k for j = 1, 2, such that k 6= j, the profits of the
firms that operate in both areas j of the U and R markets are:
Π1j = (1− (qSj + qNj)
αj
)qSj+
+(1− ((qSk + qNk)
αk
))(
βjb(qSk + qNk)
αk
)− FUj − FRj + sj,
j = 1, 2, k 6= j.
34This definition is inspired in the concept of ”yardstick competition”, as defined in
Shleifer (1985).
35If we extend our model to N areas in the R and U markets, pRj ≤
f(pU1 , ...., p
U
j−1, p
U
j+1, ...P
U
N ), j = 1, ..., N . The most likely functional form for f(.) would
be the sample mean of all prices expect pUj .
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The profits of the firms that only operate in the areas of the U market
are:
ΠNj = (1− (qSj + qNj)
αj
− c)qNj − FUj , j = 1, 2.
Given all profit functions, if we maximize them, we obtain the following
result:
Proposition 8 Under yardstick pricing, the symmetric Cournot price, pC =
1
3
, is set in the whole R and U markets.
With this new regulation, we can set the lowest possible price in the whole
country, given that firms compete a la Cournot in their respective areas of
the U market. We have reached such a good result for the social welfare
because we were able to break the strategic link that the American and the
European definition of affordable prices create between the areas of the U
and R markets. This strategic link made the equilibrium prices higher than
the symmetric Cournot price.36
This regulatory regime has a negative aspect. In order to be worthy
to apply it, we need that the differences in demand between the different
zones of the country be small enough. For example, consider a situation
where the demands in areas 1 and 2 of the U market are DU1 (p) = 1 − p
and DU2 (p) = (a − p) the demand in area 1 and 2 of the R market are
DR1 (p) = b(1 − p) and DR2 (p) = b(a − p) where a < 1.37 If we apply the
proposed definition, we find that the symmetric Cournot equilibrium for the
area 1 of the U market is pC = 1
3
, which is even bigger than the monopoly
price in the area 2 of the U market if a < 2
3
.38
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have analyzed different definitions of affordable prices under
Universal Service Obligations focusing on their implications on social welfare.
36For further details, see Anton et al. (2002) or Valletti et al. (2002).
37This could describe a situation where the R market consumers are poorer than the U
area consumers.
38This may happen in Spain or Italy if we divide the countries in such a way that the
zone 1 is the northern half of the countries (richer) and zone 2 is the southern half of the
countries (poorer).
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We have studied the different definitions under the assumption that a country
is divided into independent zones. Each of these zones consists on a profitable
and an unprofitable area.
We have studied first, the definition of affordable prices that come from
the American and the European regulatory regimes. The American regu-
latory regime advocates for a common price within each zone, whereas the
European regulatory regime advocates for a common price for the whole
country. We have shown that these two definitions of affordable prices are
equivalent when the zones are designed in such a way that the ratio between
the demands of the areas within each zone is constant. If this does not
happen, the European definition is social welfare superior to the American
definition. This is because the European definition obliges to set a unique
price in the country.
We have also presented two new definitions of affordable prices. In the
first definition, the price in all the unprofitable markets is the same and it
cannot be higher than a convex combination of the prices in the profitable
areas. We have proved that this definition is always social welfare superior
to the European definition, and by extension to the American. Under this
definition, when the welfare function is the standard, in many cases, the
regulator chooses the maximum or the minimum of the available prices to
apply it to the unprofitable market. This implies that there are profitable
areas which enjoy the symmetric Cournot price (the lowest in our context). In
the other cases, the regulator chooses convex combinations of the unprofitable
market areas prices. It may sound strange that when the regulator opts for
the maximum, this definition can be superior to the European definition.
This is so, because under some circumstances (when the total unprofitable
demand is small compared to the total demand), the best for social welfare is
to set the symmetric Cournot price to as many consumers as possible in the
profitable market, and to do so, the regulator has to impose the maximum.
When the welfare function is only the unprofitable consumers surplus, the
regulator choices change and she only chooses convex combinations of the
unprofitable market area prices. This is for two reasons. First, because
the unprofitable market consumers enjoy different prices than the profitable
market consumers, and second, because the regulator does not internalize
the profitable market consumers surplus.
The other definition we have presented is what we denote ”yardstick pric-
ing”. In this definition, the prices of the unprofitable areas can never be
higher than a function of the prices of all profitable areas expect the price
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of its own zone profitable area. With this definition, we break the strategic
link that firms use to raise the price. Thus, we can implement the symmetric
Cournot price all over the country which yields the maximum social welfare.
The problem with this last definition is that to work properly we need con-
sumers’ demands not to be very different between the different zones. For
example, this definition can yield very bad results from a social point of view
when the differences in income between zones are very high.
Given our results. National Regulatory Board should implement our first
definition when differences in demand between markets are very large, and
yardstick pricing when the differences are not significant.
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A appendix
A.1 Proof Proposition 1
We first show the result under the proviso that the regulator maximizes SW1.
In this case, she chooses α1 and β1 as to:
max
α1,β1
SW1(α1, β1) = (α1 + bβ1)
(1− pUA1 (α1, β1))2
2
+
((1−α1)+b(1−β1))(1− p
UA
2 (α1, β1))
2
2
+(α1+bβ1)p
UA
1 (α1, β1)(1−pUA1 (α1, β1))+
+((1− α1) + b(1− β1))pUA2 (α1, β1)(1− pUA2 (α1, β1)),
where the first two terms are consumers surplus and the remaining two
terms are firms profits.
Now,
pUA1 (α1, β1) =
α1 + β1b
3α1 + 2β1b
is the price in area 1 of the U market under the American regulation, and
pUA2 (α1, β1) =
(1− α1) + (1− β1)b
3(1− α1) + 2(1− β1)b
is the price in area 2 of the U market under the American regulation.
Differentiating the social welfare function with respect to α1 and β1 we
have:
∂SW1(α1, β1)
∂α1
=
(1− pUA1 (α1, β1))2
2
−(α1+bβ1)(1−pUA1 (α1, β1))
∂pUA1 (α1, β1)
∂α1
−
(1− pUA2 (α1, β1))2
2
− ((1− α1) + b(1− β1))(1− pUA2 (α1, β1))
∂pUA2 (α1, β2)
∂α1
+
pUA1 (α1, β1)(1− pUA1 (α1, β1)) + (α1 + bβ1)(
∂pUA1 (α1, β1)
∂α1
(1− pUA1 (α1, β1)))−
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(α1 + bβ1)(p
UA
1 (α1, β1)
∂pUA1 (α1, β1)
∂α1
)− pUA2 (α1, β1)(1− pUA2 (α1, β1))+
((1− α1) + b(1− β1))(∂p
UA
2 (α1, β1)
∂α1
(1− p2(α1, β2)))
−((1− α1) + b(1− β1))(pUA2 (α1, β1)(
∂pUA2 (α1, β1)
∂α1
),
and
∂W (α1, β1)
∂β1
= b
(1− pUA1 (α1, β1))2
2
− (α1+ bβ1)(1−pUA1 (α1, β1))
∂pUA1 (α1, β1)
∂β1
−b(1− p
UA
2 (α1, β1))
2
2
− ((1−α1)+ b(1−β1))(1− pUA2 (α1, β1))
∂pUA2 (α1, β2)
∂β1
+
bpUA1 (α1, β1)(1− pUA1 (α1, β1)) + (α1 + bβ1)(
∂pUA1 (α1, β1)
∂β1
(1− pUA1 (α1, β1)))
−(α1 + bβ1)(pUA1 (α1, β1)
∂pUA1 (β1, β1)
∂β1
)− bpUA2 (α1, β1)(1− pUA2 (α1, β1))+
((1− α1) + b(1− β1))(∂p
UA
2 (α1, β1)
∂β1
(1− p2(α1, β2)))
−((1− α1) + b(1− β1))(pUA2 (α1, β1)(
∂pUA2 (α1, β1)
∂β1
).
Both derivatives equal zero at α1 = β1. Since, further, the function is
concave in both variables, see figure 5, we can conclude that α1 = β1 are the
maxima of the social welfare function.
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We now analyze the regulator choice when she maximizes SW2. The
programme she faces is to maximize
bβ1
(1− pUA1 (α1, β1))2
2
+ b(1− β1)(1− p
UA
2 (α1, β1))
2
2
,
where the social welfare function is the sum of the consumers’ surplus in
the R market.
Differentiating the social welfare function with respect to α1 and β1 we
have:
∂SW2(α1, β1)
∂α1
= β1b(1−p1(α1, β1))∂p1(α1, β1)
∂α1
+(1−β1)b(1−p2(α1, β1))∂p2(α1, β1)
∂α1
and
∂SW2(α1, β1)
∂β1
= b
(1− p1(α1, β1))2
2
+ β1b(1− p1(α1, β1))∂p1(α1, β1)
∂β1
−b(1− p1(α1, β1)
2
2
+ (1− β1)b(1− p2(α1, β1))∂p2(α1, β1)
∂β1
.
As for the other social welfare function, both derivatives equal 0 at α1 =
β1. As the function is concave, α1 = β1 are maxima.
A.2 Proof Proposition 2
If α1
β1
= 1 then α2
β2
= 1 as well, as α1 + α2 = 1 and β1 + β2 = 1. Given the
equilibrium prices under the American definition:
pUAj =
(αj + βjb)
3αj + 2βjb
, j = 1, 2
The following condition has to hold in order to ensure that they are equal:
α1 + β1b
3α1 + 2β1b
=
α2 + β2b
3α2 + 2β2b
.
Note that α1/β1 = α2/β2 = 1 is a sufficient condition to guarantee that
they are equal as:
1 + b
3 + 2b
=
1 + b
3 + 2b
.
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A.3 Proof Proposition 3
We know that the price-cap pRj ≤ pUj , j = 1, 2 is binding in equilibrium.
This means that within each zone, there is a unique price. If we introduce
the price-cap pUj ≤ min{pUA1 , pUA2 }, we can guarantee that it is also binding
in equilibrium by the definition of minimum. This means that both zones
share the same prices.
A.4 Proof Proposition 4
The proof under SW1 goes as follows: under the European definition, min{pUA1 , pUA2 }
is applied to all areas of the U and R markets. Assuming without loss of gen-
erality that min{pUA1 , pUA2 } = pUA1 , the weighted price for the whole country
becomes:
α1p
UA
1 + α2p
UA
1 + β1bp
UA
1 + β2p
UA
1 .
Under the American definition zone 1 enjoys price pUA1 and zone 2 enjoys
price pU2A. Thus, the weighted price for the whole country is:
α1p
UA
1 + α2p
UA
2 + β1bp
UA
1 + β2p
UA
2
The European definition is social welfare superior when the weighted price
for the whole country is lower under this definition than under the American
definition, i.e., when the inequality below holds:
α1p
UA
1 + α2p
UA
1 + β1bp
UA
1 + β2p
UA
1 < α1p
UA
1 + α2p
UA
2 + β1bp
UA
1 + β2p
UA
2
or, rearranging, when:
pUA1 < p
UA
2
which is true by the assumption of min{pUA1 , pUA2 } = pUA1 .
Under SW2, it is trivial that the same result holds. We only need to
remove U market areas sizes from the weighted prices, and we see easily
that the weighted prices under European definition is lower than under the
American definition.
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A.5 Proof Proposition 5
Under SW1, the regulator chooses θ to maximize:
α1
(1− pU1 (θ))2
2
+ α2
(1− pU2 (θ))2
2
+ b
(1− pR(θ))2
2
+ α1p
U
1 (θ)(1− pU1 (θ))+
+α2p
U
2 (θ)(1− pU2 (θ)) + bpR(θ)(1− pR(θ))
where the first three terms are the consumers’ surpluses from areas 1 and
2 of the U market and R market respectively, and the last two terms are the
profits of firms, and where
pU1 (θ) =
α1(3α2 + 2bβ2(1− θ)2) + α2bβ1θ(1 + 2θ)
3(α1(3α2 + 2bβ2(1− θ)2) + 2α2bβ1θ2) ,
is the price in area 1 of the U market,
pU2 (θ) =
α1(α2 + bβ2(3− 5θ + 2θ2)) + 2α2bβ1θ2
3(α1(3α2 + 2bβ2(1− θ)2) + 2α2bβ1θ2) ,
is the price in area 2 of the R market, and
pR(θ) =
α1(α2 + bβ2(1− θ)2) + α2bβ1θ2)
3(α1(3α2 + 2bβ2(1− θ)2) + 2α2bβ1θ2) ,
is the price in the R market. Recall further that α1 + α2 = 1, and
β1 + β2 = 1.
Differentiating the social welfare function, we have:
∂SW1(θ)
∂θ
= −α1(1−pU1 (θ))
∂pU1 (θ)
∂θ
−α2(1−pU2 (θ))
∂pU2 (θ)
∂θ
−b(1−pR(θ))∂pR(θ)
∂θ
+
+α1(1− pU1 (θ))
∂pU1 (θ)
∂θ
+ α2(1− pU2 (θ))
∂pU2 (θ)
∂θ
+ b(1− pR(θ))∂p
R(θ)
∂θ
−
−α1pU1 (θ)
∂pU1 (θ)
∂θ
− α2pU2 (θ)
∂pU2 (θ)
∂θ
− bpR(θ)∂p
R(θ)
∂θ
= 0
Straightforward computations result in the first order conditions for max-
imum:
29
∂W (θ)
∂θ
= −α1pU1 (θ)
∂pU1 (θ)
∂θ
− α2pU2 (θ)
∂pU2 (θ)
∂θ
− bpR(θ)∂p
R(θ)
∂θ
= 0
From this first order condition, we cannot obtain a close form solution
for θ. Nevertheless, numerical resolution shows that for given α1 and b, the
optimum for θ is unique. Further, we get
1. θ∗ = 1 if β1 ∈ [0, β1]
2. θ∗ = 0 if β1 ∈ [β1]
3. θ∗ ∈ (0, 1) if β1 ∈ [β1, β1]
as it is shown in figure 3 and 4. From figure 3, we can also see how β1
and β1 are increasing function of α1. From figure 4, we can see that β1 is
an increasing function of b while β1 is a decreasing function of b. Finally, we
have checked that these optima are indeed maxima.
A.6 Proof Proposition 6
Under SW2 the regulator’s objective function becomes:
SW2(θ) = b
(1− pR(θ))2
2
Solving the first order condition for maximum we get:
∂SW2(θ)
∂θ
= b(1− pR(θ))∂p
R(θ)
∂(θ)
= 0⇒ θ∗∗ = α1(1− β1)
(1− α1)β1 + α1(1− β1 .
Since SW2(θ) is a concave function as we can see in Figure 7, we can
conclude that θ∗∗ is an optimal solution.
A.7 Proof Proposition 7
We start from the case when in equilibrium pR = min{pUA1 , pUA2 } and we
suppose that min{pUA1 , pUA2 } = pUA1 . Therefore areas 1 and 2 of the R market
enjoy a price pUA1 , as well as area 1 of the U market. Area 2 of the R
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market enjoys the symmetric Cournot price which is lower than pUA1 . We can
construct a weighted price for the whole country under this definition:
α1p
UA
1 + α2p
C + bpUA1 .
where pC is the symmetric Cournot price. On the other hand, the Euro-
pean definition applies pUA1 to the whole country. Thus, the weighted price
for the whole country is:
α1p
UA
1 + α2p
UA
1 + bp
UA
1 .
The new definition is superior in terms of social welfare if it gives a lower
weighted price than the European definition. This happens if
α1p
UA
1 + α2p
C + bpUA1 < α1p
UA
1 + α2p
UA
1 + bp
UA
1
or equivalently, if pC < pUA1 , what is true. Therefore, the new definition
is superior to the European definition, whenever we apply min{pUA1 , pUA2 }. If
we take into account that we only apply either max{pUA1 , pUA2 } or θ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
when they are social welfare superior to min{pUA1 , pUA2 }, we can conclude that
this definition is always social welfare superior to the European definition,
and by extension to the American as we have shown previously.
A.8 Proof Proposition 8
The firms that operate in both areas maximize:
ΠSj = (1− (qSj + qNj)
αj
)qSj+
(1− ((qSk + qNk)
αk
)− c)(βjb(qSk + qNk)
αk
)− FUj − FRj + sj
j = 1, 2, k 6= j.
If we take the derivative of the profit function with respect to q1j, we
obtain the first order conditions:
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∂ΠSj
∂qsj
= (1− (2qSj + qNj
αj
)) = 0, j = 1, 2
The firms that only operate in the areas of the U market maximize:
ΠNj = (1− (qSj + qNj)
αj
)qNj − FUj , j = 1, 2
If we take the derivative of the profit function with respect to qNj, we
obtain the first order conditions:
∂ΠNj
∂qNj
= (1− (qSj + 2qNj
αj
)) = 0, j = 1, 2
These first order conditions yield the following equilibrium quantities:
q∗Sj =
αj
3
, q∗Nj =
αj
3
, j = 1, 2
If we substitute the equilibrium quantities in the demand function, we
obtain the equilibrium price for the areas of the U market which is the sym-
metric Cournot price:
pU∗j = (1−
q∗Sj + q
∗
Nj
αj
) =
1
3
, j = 1, 2
As we have seen previously, the prices in the zones are the same for both
areas, therefore, the symmetric Cournot price is also set in the areas of the
R market.
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Figure 1 
Zone 1= area R1 + area U1 
Zone 2= area R2+ area U2 
R market
U market
area U2 area U1 
?1 ?2
?2?1
area R1 area R2 
Figure 1: Example of a country divided in zones
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Figure 2: The regulator optimal choice between max{pUA1 , pUA2 } and
min{pUA1 , pUA2 }
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Figure 3: Equilibrium path for θ∗ under different values of α1.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium path for θ∗ under different values of b.
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Figure 5: Social Welfare Function SW1.
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Figure 6: Equilibrium path for θ∗ and θ∗∗ under both definitions of Social
Welfare.
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Figure 7: Social Welfare Function SW2.
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